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Abstract
We conduct experiments in which humans repeatedly play one of two games against
a computer decision maker that follows either a reinforcement learning algorithm or
an Experience Weighted Attraction algorithm. The human/algorithm interaction pro-
vides results that can’t be obtained from the analysis of pure human interactions or
model simulations. These learning algorithms are more sensitive than humans to ex-
ploitable opponent play. Learning algorithms respond to these calculated opportunities
systematically; however, the magnitude of these responses are too weak to improve the
algorithm’s payoﬀs. Human play against various decision maker types does not vary
signiﬁcantly. These results demonstrate that humans and current models of their be-
havior diﬀer in that humans do not adjust payoﬀ assessments by smooth transition
functions but when humans do detect exploitable play they are more likely to choose
the best response to this belief.1 Introduction
Identifying how humans respond and adapt their behavior in repeated strategic decision
making tasks has emerged as a core, but diﬃcult to answer, question in the social sciences.
To address this question, most studies formulate alternative adaptive or “learning” models
and estimate model parameters from human experimental data. These estimated models
are either evaluated for goodness-of-ﬁt by various statistical criteria or used to generate
simulations which are subsequently compared to human experimental play. Unfortunately,
deﬁnitive conclusions are diﬃcult to achieve using this approach because current econometric
techniques generate exceedingly high rates of Type I and Type II errors when evaluating
alternative adaptive models of play (Salmon [21] (2001)).
One source of this diﬃculty is the nature of the problem. Learning in games is a multi-
variate stochastic process. One component of this process is a set of latent variables, such as
beliefs about opponents or values associated with alternative actions, which each individual
uses to select actions and adjusts according to game history. If play doesn’t coincide with
an equilibrium and players condition actions on the common observed history of play, strong
interdependencies are likely to exist among the adjustment rules of the players’ latent vari-
ables. When a researcher seeks to identify the rules underlying the interdependent latent
processes, typically the only observable information is the sequence of realized choices from
discrete action sets. Unfortunately, these interdependent and dynamic latent processes, and
the resultant sequences of discrete choices are substantial obstacles for current econometric
methods.
In this study we adopt a technique that exercises experimental control of strategic inter-
dependence and enables us to gain greater insight into the rules humans use to adjust their
play in games. We conduct hybrid experiments in which humans play simple 2 £ 2 games
against alternative computer-implemented learning algorithms. Each game has a unique
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. This technique lets us directly control the nature
of the dependence of one of the players. In turn this allows us to more accurately assess
human response to opponents adopting particular learning rules. Furthermore, we are able
to better evaluate the appropriateness and properties of alternative hypothesized models of
human adaptive behavior in games.
1A myriad of recently proposed learning models embody two common principles: smooth
adjustment rules for values of actions and probabilistic choice. First, for each of the players’
actions the models ascribe a latent variable which represents the value of the action. This
value is updated after each play of the game according to an adaptive rule and the stage game
outcome. Second, in each stage game a player selects his action according to a probabilistic
choice rule. This probabilistic choice rule assigns higher probabilities to actions with greater
latent values. Typically these models include unobservable parameters whose values are
estimated from experimental data. Uniformly across studies, estimated parameter values
specify adaptive rules that have signiﬁcant memory and thus the incremental relative stage
game impact on calculated action values is small. In turn, this leads to “smooth” adjustment
rules: from period to period, action choices and resultant mixed strategies do not drastically
vary.
For this study we adopt two prominent learning models of this type: Erev and Roth’s [6]
(1998) reinforcement learning model and Camerer and Ho’s [2] (1999) experienced weighted
attraction model. There are many other similarly structured models worth studying with
our technique, but models in this class tend to generate similar play (Salmon [21]) and
consequently most of the potential insights can be gained through the evaluation of just one
or two models of this type.
We believe our technique reveals properties about both human learning and learning
models which cannot be discovered through either pure human experimentation or pure
simulation. We present the following summary of our main results. Human play does not
signiﬁcantly vary depending on whether the opponent is a human or a learning algorithm.
In contrast, algorithm play markedly diﬀers when playing against a human rather than an
identical algorithm in a simulation. When humans’ action frequencies deviate from their
Nash equilibrium proportions, the algorithms’ action choice proportions respond with sys-
tematic adjustments towards their pure strategy best responses. Adjustments of algorithms
in response to their human opponents’ play result in a strikingly linear relationship between
the learning models’ and humans’ action frequencies. Moreover, the linear relationship is
suggestive of the computer players’ best response correspondence. While adjustments by
the algorithms are remarkably regular, their linear nature produces quite muted response
2magnitudes. In fact, magnitudes of the adjustments are too small to result in statistically
signiﬁcant gains in their game payoﬀs.
Our experimental study is just one of several that exploit laboratory control to better
measure some of the latent variables underlying human play in games.1 The composite
ﬁnding of these studies paints a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent picture of human learning in games
than the class of models considered by this study. Speciﬁcally, experiments with unique
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium games have shown that humans’ beliefs about opponent
play are highly volatile from period to period (Nyarko and Schotter [16](2002)), and corre-
spondingly players’ mixed strategies exhibit signiﬁcant variability with signiﬁcant amounts of
switching between pure and mixed strategy play (Shachat [22](2002)). Furthermore, humans
are also quite successful at signiﬁcantly increasing their payoﬀs when computerized oppo-
nents play either stationary non-equilibrium ﬁxed mixed strategies (Lieberman [12](1961)
and Fox [7](1972)) or highly serially correlated action sequences (Messick [14](1967) and
Coricelli [4](2001)). In summary, human play is characterized by volatile beliefs, variable
mixed strategy choices, and successful exploitation of some strategies. In contrast, the learn-
ing models we evaluate generate beliefs that are smooth, make only minor mixed strategy
adjustments from period to period, and have an inability to take advantage of calculated
payoﬀ-increasing opportunities.
We proceed with a discussion of several past studies incorporating human versus computer
game play. Then we present the two learning models adopted in our study. In the fourth
section we discuss the games used in our experiments and our experimental procedures.
Section 5 covers our experiment results, ﬁndings and interpretations. In conclusion, we
integrate our results with other experimental results to provide a summary of human play
in games and contrast this with currently proposed learning models.
1For example Camerer, Johnson, Rymon, & Sen [3](1993) and Crawford, Costa-Gomes, &
Broseta [5](2000) studied information look-up patterns of subjects. Also, Nyarko & Shotter [16](2002)
elicited subjects’ beliefs of opponents’ future actions.
32 Literature Review
In a number of past studies, researchers have used the technique of humans interacting
with computerized decision makers. This technique has been used in various studies to
identify social preferences in strategic settings (Houser and Kurzban [10] (2000), and McCabe
et al [13] (2001)), to establish experimental control over player expectations (Roth and
Shoumaker [20] (1983), and Winter and Zamir [24] (1997)), and to identify how humans
play against particular strategies in games (as in Walker, Smith, and Cox [23] (1987)). In
this section, we discuss the last type of study and summarize established results on how
humans play against unique minimax solutions, non-optimal stationary mixed strategies,
and variants of the ﬁctitious play dynamic (with deterministic choice rules) in the context
of repeated constant-sum games with unique minimax solutions in mixed strategies.
All of the studies we discuss incorporated ﬁxed human-computer pairs playing repetitions
of one of the zero-sum games presented in Table 4.2 Studies by Lieberman [12] (1961), Mes-
sick [14] (1967), and Fox [7] (1972) all contain treatments where humans played against an
experimenter-implemented minimax strategy. In these studies, the human participants were
not informed of the explicit mixed strategy adopted by their computerized counterparts.3
All three of these studies reach the same conclusion: human play does not correspond to
the minimax prediction, and only in the Fox study does the human play adjust – albeit
weakly – towards the minimax prediction. These results are not surprising because when a
“computer” adopts its minimax strategy the human’s expected payoﬀs are equal for all of
his actions.
However, this indiﬀerence is not present when the computer adopts non-minimax mixed
strategies. Lieberman [12] and Fox [7] both studied human play against non-optimal sta-
tionary mixed strategies and discovered that humans do adjust their play to exploit (though
not fully) their opponents. In the relevant Lieberman treatment, subjects played against the
experimenter for a total of 200 periods. In the ﬁrst 100 periods, the experimenter played
2In some of these studies the experimenters implemented stationary mixed strategies by using pre-selected
computer generated random sequences in their non-computerized experiments.
3When reported, humans were instructed something similar to, “The computer has been programmed to
play so as to make as much money as possible. Its goal in the game is to minimize the amount of money
you win and to maximize its own winnings.” (Messick [14], page 35)
4his minimax strategy of (.25, .75) and then in the ﬁnal 100 periods the experimenter played
a non-minimax strategy of (.5, .5). Humans players were not informed that their opponent
had adjusted his strategy. Human play adjusted from best responding approximately 20 per-
cent of the time right after the experimenter began non-minimax play, to best responding
approximately 70 percent of the time by the end of the session. However, this experimental
design made it diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate between the attractiveness of the minimax strategy
and the best response since they both lay in the direction of this observed shift.
In one of Fox’s treatment, humans played 200 periods against a computer which played
the non-minimax mixed strategy (.6, .4) for the entire session. This design placed the
human’s best response, (1, 0), on the opposite side of (.5, .5) from the human’s minimax
strategy, (.214, .786). Human play started slightly above (.5, .5) and then slowly adjusted
towards the pure strategy best response over the course of the experiment. Speciﬁcally,
humans were best responding approximately 75 percent of the time by the latter stages of
the experiment. These experiments established that humans will adjust their behavior to
take advantage (but not as much as possible) of exploitable stationary mixed strategies.
Messick [14](and Coricelli [4] (2001) conducted experiments to evaluate how humans
respond when playing against variations of ﬁctitious play.4 These experiments are notable in
that the computer’s strategy was responsive to the actions selected by its opponent. Messick
studied humans matched against two ﬁctitious play algorithms: one with unlimited memory
and the other with only a ﬁve period memory. Against unlimited memory ﬁctitious play,
humans earned substantially more than their minimax payoﬀ level. Humans earned an even
greater average payoﬀ against limited memory ﬁctitious play. In the study by Coricelli,
there are two treatments (both utilizing the game form introduced by O’Neill [17] (1985)) in
which humans play against unlimited memory ﬁctitious play and against the same algorithm
that has a bias in the beliefs that subjects tend not to repeat their “P” action. In both
treatments humans win signiﬁcantly more often against the algorithms than they do against
humans.5 Establishing that humans can “outgame” these algorithms is signiﬁcant, though
4In the original formulations of ﬁctitious play (Brown [1](1951) and Robinson [18](1951)) a player uses
the empirical distribution of the entire history of his opponent’s action choices as his belief of the opponent’s
current mixed strategy and then chooses a best response to this belief.
5Human vs. human data for this conclusion are taken from O’Neill [17] (1985) and Shachat [22](2002).
5not surprising. It is well known that in games with unique mixed strategy equilibrium, the
ﬁctitious play algorithm can generate strong positively serially correlated action choices that
are easily exploited.6 It was this speculated vulnerability that partially motivated game
theorists to propose and study adaptive learning models which incorporated probabilistic
choice as a key component.7
To summarize, through the use of experiments pitting humans against algorithms in
constant sum games with strictly mixed strategy solutions we have learned (1) that humans
do not tend to play their minimax strategy in response to opponents playing their minimax
strategy, (2) humans exploit (but not fully) opponents who play mixed strategies signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from their minimax strategy, and (3) humans exploit adaptive algorithms which
generate highly serially correlated action choices.
3 Response Algorithms
A large number of adaptive behavioral models have been recently introduced into the liter-
ature on games. Most of these models have similar frameworks with two main components.
First, each player retains a latent “score” for each of his available actions, and the score of
each action is adjusted after each game iteration based on the outcome. Second, each player
chooses an action according to a probability distribution that places higher probability on
actions with higher scores. Unfortunately, for obvious reasons we must limit the number of
models we consider. We focus on two of the more popular models in the experimental games
literature: Erev and Roth’s [6](1998) Reinforcement model and Camerer and Ho’s [2](1999)
Experience Weighted Attraction model.
3.1 Reinforcement Learning
Erev and Roth’s model (hereafter RE) is motivated by the reinforcement hypothesis from
psychology; an action’s score is incremented by a greater amount when it results in a “posi-
tive” outcome rather than a “negative” outcome. More formally, let Rij(t) denote player i’s
6See Jordan [11](1993) and Gjerstad [9](1996).
7For example, see cautious ﬁctitious play proposed by Fudenberg and Levine [8] (1995), and the two
learning models we utilize in this study.
6score for his jth action prior to the game at iteration t; let ¾ij(t) denote the probability that
i chooses j at iteration t; and let Xi denote the set of player i’s possible stage-game payoﬀs.
The two initial conditions for the dynamical system are (1) that at the initial iteration,
each of a player’s actions has the same probability of being selected (i.e., in our two games,
¾ij(1) = :5 for each player i and each action j) and (b) that
Rij(1) = ¾ij(1)S(1)Xi;
where S(1) is an unobservable strength parameter, which inﬂuences the player’s sensitivity
to subsequent experience, and Xi is the absolute value of player i’s payoﬀ averaged across
all action proﬁles.
After each iteration, each action’s score is updated as follows
Rij(t + 1) = (1 ¡ Á)Rij(t) +
³
(1 ¡ ")I(ai(t)=j) +
²
2
´
(¼i(j;a¡i(t)) ¡ minfXig);
where Á is an unobservable parameter that discounts past scores, I(ai(t)=j) is an indicator
function for the event that player i selected action j in period t, " is an unobservable pa-
rameter determining the relative impacts on the scores of the selected vs. the unselected
action; and ¼i(j;a¡i(t)) is i ’s payoﬀ when he plays action j against the opponent’s stage-t
action a¡i(t). (Player i’s minimum possible payoﬀ for any action proﬁle, minfXig; is sub-
tracted from ¼i(j;a¡i(t)) for normalization purposes and to avoid negative scores.) The
second component of the model, a probabilistic choice rule is speciﬁed as
¾ij(t) =
Rij(t)
P
k Rik(t)
:
For each game we consider, parameters of the model are estimated along the lines sug-
gested by Erev and Roth. We estimate the values of S(1);Á; and " by minimizing the mean
square error of the predicted proportions of Left play in 20-period trial blocks for the human
versus human treatments. More speciﬁcally, for each ﬁxed triple of parameter values from
a discrete grid, we proceed as follows: we simulate the play of 500 ﬁxed pairs engaging in
200 iterations, and then we calculate separately the frequency of Left play by the 500 Row
players and by the 500 Column players in each 20-period block. These frequencies are the
model’s predictions for that triple of parameter values. The grid is then searched for the
optimal parameters.
73.2 Experience-Weighted Attraction
We use the version of EWA as presented in Camerer & Ho [2](1999). While the structure
of the EWA formulation is similar to RE learning, it adopts a diﬀerent parametric form of
probabilistic choice and it updates actions’ scores according to what actions actually earned
in past play, and what actions hypothetically would have earned if they had been played.
According to EWA subjects choose stage-game actions probabilistically according to the
logistic distribution
¾ij(t) =
e¸Rij(t)
P
k e¸Rik(t);
where at stage t player i chooses action j with probability ¾ij(t); where ¸ is the inverse
precision (variance) parameter, and where Rij(t) is a scoring function, as in the RE model,
albeit deﬁned (i.e., updated) diﬀerently. The updating of Rij(t) involves a “discounting”
factor N(t), which is updated according to
N(t + 1) = ½N(t) + 1 for t = 1;
where ½ is an unobservable discount parameter and N(1) is an unobservable parameter,
interpreted as the strength of experience prior to the beginning of play. The score Rij(t) is
then updated as follows:
Rij(t + 1) =
N(t)ÁRij(t) + ((1 ¡ ")I(ai(t)=j) + "
2)¼i(j;a¡i(t))
N(t + 1)
;
where ¼i(j;a¡i(t));Á; and " are interpreted the same as in the Erev and Roth model. The
initial scores, Rij(1) for each i and j, are additional unobservable parameters.
The parameters of the EWA model are estimated via maximum likelihood. It is worth
noting that EWA is a ﬂexible speciﬁcation that includes several other models as special cases.
For example, a simple reinforcement learning model is generated when N(1) = 0, " = 0, and
½ = 0; and probabilistic ﬁctitious play is generated when " = ½ = Á = 1. 8
8We refer the reader to Camerer and Ho [2](1999) for more discussion of how EWA can emulate various
models and for a more complete interpretation of the parameters.
84 Experimental Procedure
There are three basic steps in our experimental methodology. First, we collect baseline data
samples consisting of ﬁxed human versus human pairs playing 100 or 200 rounds with one
of two 2 £ 2 games. Second, we estimate parameters for the two learning models separately
for each of the two games. In the third step, a new sampling of humans play one of the two
games against an estimated learning algorithm. We proceed by describing the two games we
used and then presenting more details on the outlined steps.
4.1 The Two Games
The ﬁrst game we consider is a zero-sum asymmetric matching penny game called Pursue-
Evade. This game was introduced by Rosenthal, Shachat, and Walker [19](2002) (hereafter
RSW). The normal form representation of the game is given in Table 1. The Nash equilibrium
(and minimax solution) of this game is symmetric: each player chooses Left with a probability
of two-thirds.
There are several reasons why this game is a strong candidate to use in our study. (1) The
zero-sum nature eliminates any social utility concerns often found in experimental studies of
games, thereby mitigating some behavioral eﬀects that might arise if a human suspects he is
playing against a computer rather than another human. (2) With some standard behavioral
assumptions, the repeated game has a unique Nash equilibrium path which calls for repeated
play of the stage game Nash equilibrium. This eliminates potential repeated game eﬀects
that the algorithms are not designed to address. (3) Pursue-Evade is a simple game in which
the Nash equilibrium predictions diﬀer from equiprobable choice. This generates a powerful
test against the alternative hypothesis of equiprobable play.
We selected our second game to pose a more serious challenge to the learning algorithms.
We refer to our second game, presented in Table 2, as Gamble-Safe. Each player has a
Gamble action (Left for each player) from which he receives a payoﬀ of either two or zero
and a Safe action (Right for each player) which guarantees a payoﬀ of one. This game
has a unique mixed strategy in which each player chooses his Left action with probability
one-half, and his expected Nash equilibrium payoﬀ is one. The diﬀerence between the Nash
9equilibrium and the minimax solution makes this game challenging for the learning models.
Notice that this game is not constant-sum; therefore the minimax solution need not coincide
with the Nash equilibrium. In this game, Right is a pure minimax strategy for both players
that guarantees a payoﬀ of one. A game whose minimax and Nash equilibrium solutions
diﬀer but generate the same expected payoﬀ is called a non-proﬁtable game.9 The potential
attraction of the minimax strategy can (and does) prove to be diﬃcult for the learning
algorithms which, loosely speaking, have best response ﬂavors.
4.2 Protocols
4.2.1 Human vs. Human Baselines
For the human vs. human play in the Pursue-Evade game we use the data generated by RSW.
In their hand-run experiments, a pair of subjects were seated on the same side of a table with
an opaque screen dividing them. The Evader was given an endowment of currency. Each
player was given two index cards: one labelled Left and the other labelled Right. At each
iteration the players slid the chosen card to the experimenter seated across from them. Then
the experimenter simultaneously turned over the cards, executed the payoﬀs, and recorded
the actions. Twenty pairs of human subjects played this treatment: fourteen for 100 periods
and six for 200 periods.
The human versus human baseline experiments for the Gamble-Safe game were executed
via computerized interaction. Each subject was seated at a separate computer terminal such
that no subject could observe the screen of any other subject. All subjects participated in
either 100 or 200 repetitions of the game maintaining a constant role throughout.
The protocol for each period was as follows. At the beginning of each repetition, a subject
saw a graphical representation of the game on the screen. Column players had the display
of their game transformed so that they appeared to be a Row player. Thus, all subjects
selected an action by clicking on a row, and then conﬁrming their selection. Subjects were
free to change row selections before conﬁrmation. Once an action was conﬁrmed, a subject
waited until his opponent also conﬁrmed an action. Then, a subject saw the resultant
9Morgan and Sefton [15, (2002)] present an excellent study investigating human play in Non proﬁtable
games.
10outcome highlighted on the game display, as well as a text message stating both actions and
the subject’s earnings for that repetition. Finally, at all times a history of past play was
displayed to the subjects. This history consisted of an ordered list with each row displaying
the number of the iteration, the actions selected by both players, and the subject’s earnings.
4.2.2 Human vs. Algorithm Treatments
We conducted our hybrid treatments using both the computer program and protocol used for
the Gamble-Safe game baseline.10 In these treatments, two human subjects played against
each other for the ﬁrst 23 repetitions of the game. Then, unbeknownst to the human pair,
they stopped playing against each other and for the remainder of the experiment they each
played against a computer that implemented either the EWA or RE learning algorithm.
We adopted a simple technique to make the “split” seamless from the subjects’ per-
spectives. From period twenty-four on, the two human/computer pairs had no interaction
except for the timing of how action choices were revealed. Speciﬁcally, although the comput-
ers generated their action choices instantly, the computers didn’t reveal their choices until
both humans had selected their actions. This protocol preserved the natural timing rhythm
established by the humans in the ﬁrst twenty-three stage games.
The non-human opponent treatments began with an initial stage of human versus human
play in order to give the algorithms a better chance of successfully “standing in” for the
human whose place it will take. Both RE and EWA rely on actions’ scores to determine the
chosen action in a probabilistic manner. During the ﬁrst 23 repetitions, we allow these scores
to “prime” themselves with the play generated by the subjects. (Although the updating of
the scores is determined by the parameter estimates obtained from the baseline treatments).
That is, even though the response algorithms are not selecting actions during the ﬁrst 23
repetitions, the scores are still being updated according to the speciﬁcations of the previous
section. For example, consider the 24th repetition of a game. The human Row player is
now facing a computer that is playing the Column position. Moreover, during the ﬁrst
23 repetitions, the computer Column player has been updating the scores associated with
Column’s actions based on the observed actions of both humans. We conjecture this will
10For the Pursue-Evade game, the Evader was given a currency endowment.
11de-emphasize the impact of the estimated initial score values of the actions.
In summary, we have two treatment variables, the stage game and the type of opponent.
The data samples we have for each treatment cell are given in Table 3.11
5 Baseline Results, Model Estimation, and Model Sim-
ulation
Our experimental baselines are the human versus human play in each of the games we
consider. Inspection of the aggregate data reveals that play in the two games departs from the
Nash equilibrium and the dynamic features of the data suggest non-stationarity of play. After
estimating the unobserved parameters of the learning models, we simulated large numbers of
experiments based upon these estimated versions. The simulations reveal that the learning
models generate aggregate choice frequencies similar to the experimental data, but only
weakly mimic the experimental data time series. Furthermore, the simulations do not reveal
striking diﬀerences between the two learning models.
We use the data from RSW as the Pursue-Evade game baseline data set. Figure 1 shows
contingency tables for the data aggregated across subject pairs and stage games. A graph
of the time series of the average proportion of Left play for the Row and Column players
is shown below each table. Each observation in a series is the average across a twenty
period time block. As noted by RSW, the contingency table is distinctly diﬀerent from the
Nash equilibrium predictions (the numbers in parentheses) and Column subjects play Left
signiﬁcantly more often than the Row subjects.12 In the block average time series, we see
that the Column series almost always lies above the Row series and that both series exhibit
an increasing trend.
Using this data, RSW estimated the parameters of both the RE and EWA models.
As noted by RSW, both models have some success in explaining the deviation. Using the
estimated models we simulated 10,000 experiments of twenty pairs playing the Pursue-Evade
game for 200 iterations. Averages from the 10,000 simulated experiments were used to
11We explain in the next section why we have no observations for the EWA Gamble-Safe treatment.
12Moreover, the Column subject plays Left more frequently than his Row counterpart in almost all pairs.
12construct contingency tables and time series in the same format as those presented for
the baseline data. These results are presented alongside the baseline results in Figure 1.
Unsurprisingly, given the respective objective functions used to select model parameters,
casual observation suggests that the EWA model generates an expected contingency very
close to the human baseline and the RE model more accurately mimics dynamics in the
times series.
We provide a corresponding analysis for the Gamble-Safe game in Figure 2. In the con-
tingency table for the baseline data we observe that the Row subjects play Right signiﬁcantly
more than Left, while Column subjects played Left more often. This result partly comes
from two pairs in which the Row and Column subjects’ action proﬁle sequence eventually
converged to the proﬁle (Safe, Gamble). This is evident around the midpoint of the times
series for the baseline treatment, where we see the Column and Row subjects’ series diverge.
This convergence to minimax play by the Row subjects in these two pairs is problematic
for the maximum likelihood estimation used in the EWA model. Speciﬁcally, the long strings
of Left by Column leads the EWA model to assign a near zero probability to Right (Safe) by
Row for any possible parameter values. However, since Row is repeatedly choosing Right in
these instances there is a zero likelihood problem in estimating the EWA parameters. Rather
than violate the maximum likelihood criterion for parameter selection speciﬁed by Camerer
and Ho we chose not to conduct a Human versus EWA treatment for this game.
Since the selection of parameters for the RE model does not rely upon maximum like-
lihood estimation we obtain estimates which generate the best ﬁt for the baseline data.
Interestingly we see that the RE contingency table is remarkably similar to the Baseline
table. However, the predicted RE dynamics are remarkably smooth and do not resemble
the Baseline time series. We believe this failure results from the inability of the model to
incorporate the heterogenous behavior the occurs when some players adopt the minimax
strategy and other players adopt adaptive strategies.
The comparison of the experimental data to simulations based upon estimated versions
of the learning models suggests that the learning models successfully capture some features
of the humans disequilibrium behavior. However, time series views of the simulation data
exhibit much smoother and less extreme dynamics than the experiment data, which suggests
13that learning models are not as responsive as humans and tend to simply “ﬁt” aggregate
human choice frequencies.
6 Analysis of Human/Algorithm Interaction
In the previous section we used a common technique of comparing experimental data to
simulation results to evaluate the appropriateness of alternative learning models. Now we
proceed to present analysis of human/algorithm interaction which reveals a signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent story. The action choice frequencies by the algorithms are more responsive to
opponents’ play than the humans’ action choice frequencies. Moreover, the action frequencies
by each algorithm adjusts linearly toward its best response to its opponent’s non-equilibrium
action frequencies. However, the magnitude of these adjustments is too small to generate
payoﬀ gains for the learning algorithms. Finally, we see that human play does not vary
signiﬁcantly whether the opponent is another human or a learning algorithm. Examination
of the human/human experiments and the model simulations don’t reveal these results.
6.1 Learning Algorithm Response to Opponents’ Play
We now introduce pair-level data to better highlight diﬀerences in play across treatments.
Inspection of the Row and Column players’ proportions of Left play in each pair reveals sur-
prising diﬀerences from purely human play and the simulations reported in the prior section.
The learning algorithms are quite responsive to human deviations from Nash equilibrium
play. Speciﬁcally, the algorithms’ frequencies of Left play have a striking linear correlation
to their human opponents’ Left play proportions. Moreover, these linear relationships are
consistent with a linear approximation of the algorithms’ best response correspondences.
These results are most easily seen in Figures 3 - 5. Each of these ﬁgures is a 2 £ 2
array of scatterplot panels. The rows in the panel array correspond to the decision maker
type for the Row player: the top row indicates human decision maker and the bottom row
indicates computer decision maker. Similarly the columns of the panel array correspond to
the decision maker type for the Column player: the left column for human and the right
column for computer. Hence the upper left panel is from the human/human baselines, the
14lower right panel is from the algorithm/algorithm simulations, and the oﬀ diagonal panels
are from the human/algorithm and algorithm/human experiments.
The scatterplots are of the proportions of Left play by the Row and Column players
in each pair after the ﬁrst 23 iterations. In the simulation panel we only use the data
from a single simulated experiment with twenty pairs playing 200 iterations. Also, each of
these scatterplots displays a trend line and a dashed line for the computer’s best response
correspondence.
Examination of these ﬁgures reveals important common results across the two games
and learning models. Comparisons between the two main diagonal panels reveal consistent
diﬀerences and similarities between human/human play and pure simulations of model in-
teraction. Both types of interactions generate uncorrelated “clouds” with the simulations’
clouds exhibiting much smaller dispersion.13 This raises the issue of whether the learning
models are quite aggressive in adaptation and quickly converge to an equilibrium or instead
the models are quite insensitive to opponents’ play and just stubbornly mimic human ag-
gregate frequencies. We can ask a similar question regarding human play. Do the humans’
dispersed clouds result from high variance in the humans’ propensities to play Left coupled
with little response to the opponents’ play or is it the result of diﬀerential skill in human
play in which some humans more successfully exploit other humans’ play?
Inspection of the human and learning algorithm interactions answers these questions. In
contrast to the model simulations and human/human play, the scatter plots of human and
learning algorithm interactions (found in the oﬀ-diagonal panels of Figures 3 - 5) exhibit
strongly correlated interactions. This is evident by the tight clustering of the data around
the plotted regression lines. Also, in each case the regression line is in the direction of the
computer players’ best response correspondence (the dashed correspondence given on each
scatterplot). In other words, the computer “better” responds instead of best responds. This
is best illustrated by an observation in the upper right scatter plot of Figure 3. In this
scatterplot, Column RE players play against human Row players in the Gamble-Safe game.
One of the human players chose his Minimax strategy, Right, exclusively and his computer
RE opponent best responded to this only about 70 percent of the time. Hence, we see that
13F-tests reject the signiﬁcance of the presented regression lines; this gives statistical support for claims
of no correlation.
15(1) the frequency of Left by the learning algorithms move toward (but not all the way to)
the best response to their opponents’ frequencies, and (2) the magnitude of these responses
by the algorithms is a surprisingly predictable linear relationship.
Table 5 gives some quantitative support for these observations by presenting the OLS
results of regressing the learning algorithms’ Left frequencies on their human counterparts’
Left frequencies. A learning algorithm that is highly sensitive and adjusts systematically to
opponents’ play should generate regressions that explain a high percentage of the variance of
the algorithm’s Left frequencies, and the estimated slope coeﬃcient should be consistent with
the best response correspondence. These features are found in the Table 5 regressions: the
slope of each regression has the correct sign, three of the regressions have exceedingly large
adjusted R2 statistics, and a fourth is still quite large considering the data is cross sectional.
These adjusted R2 results reﬂect the tight clustering to the ﬁtted regression line observed in
the scatterplots and correspondingly the detection and systematic reaction by the learning
algorithms to calculated payoﬀ-increasing opportunities. Correspondingly, F-tests for these
four regressions do not reject the signiﬁcance of the regressions at the 5 percent level of
signiﬁcance. Interestingly, the two cases where F-tests reject the regressions are when the
EWA and RE algorithms assume the Column role in the Pursue- Evade game. We do not
see a reason for the diﬀerential performance, but do note that the mean of the computers’
data is close to their minimax strategy in this case.
6.2 Learning Algorithms’ Lack of Eﬀective Exploitation
Previous arguments established that the learning algorithms are quite sensitive in detecting
opponents’ exploitable action choice frequencies and then the algorithms respond with a
systematic but tempered best response. However, we will now see that these statistically
signiﬁcant responses are too weak in magnitude to generate statistically signiﬁcant payoﬀ
gains. Table 6 presents the average stage game winnings for all decision maker types when
pitted against a human for each role and game. If the learning algorithms successfully exploit
human decision makers we would expect the algorithms in each game and role to have greater
winnings than a human when playing against a human in the competing role. The average
stage game winnings in Table 6 do not exhibit this trait.
16The reported average stage game winning statistics are calculated by ﬁrst taking the
total session winnings for each decision maker who plays against a human, and dividing by
the number of stage games played.14 Then we partition these decision makers according to
the game played, role played, and decision maker type. Finally, we report the average stage
game earnings across decision makers in each partition. For each game and player role we
conduct t-tests with the null hypothesis that on average a non-human decision maker earns
the same as a human when the opponent is a human. At a 5 percent level of signiﬁcance
we fail to reject the null hypothesis in four out of the six tests. In the two rejections, the
human average exceeds the algorithm average.
Why don’t the learning algorithms, which are sensitive and reactive to opponent play,
generate higher payoﬀs than humans? The answer is twofold. First, the two games we con-
sider have fairly ﬂat payoﬀ spaces in the mixed strategy domains presented in Figures 3 - 5.
Thus a pair must be far removed from the Nash equilibrium to generate large payoﬀ devia-
tions from Nash equilibrium payoﬀs. Second, whenever the algorithm calculates a diﬀerence
between its two action scores, it adjusts choice probabilities without assessing whether this
diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. If this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant, then
there is no adjustment that can generate a real increase in payoﬀ. Alternatively, an adjust-
ment to a statistically signiﬁcant score diﬀerence may also fail to generate a real increase in
payoﬀs. Why? We have already seen that algorithms adjust in statistically signiﬁcant ways,
but these adjustments are relatively small in magnitude. These weak adjustments are the
product of probabilistic choice rules, which were adopted to avoid generating transparent
serially correlated choice patterns.
6.3 Human Play Conditional On Opponent Decision Maker Type
Past studies have demonstrated that humans play diﬀerently against Nash equilibrium strate-
gies than they do against other humans. However, we also have presented arguments that
suggest learning algorithms’ play is more responsive to opponents’ decisions than human play
is. A natural question to ask is, do humans play diﬀerently against learning algorithms than
14We normalize this way because in the baseline data for Pursue-Evade and Gamble-Safe some pairs played
100 stage games and others 200.
17they do against other humans? To answer this question we compare the empirical distribu-
tions of the proportions of Left play by humans when facing the diﬀerent decision-making
types as presented in the scatter plots of Figures 3 - 5. We report a series of Kolmogorov-
Smirnov two-sample goodness-of-ﬁt tests (hereafter denoted KS) comparing the distributions
of Left play proportions against human opponents to Left play proportions against the al-
ternative algorithms. The main result is that we can’t ﬁnd diﬀerences in human play except
in the case when the human is the Row player in the Pursue-Evade game.
Figure 6 shows the empirical CDFs of proportion of Left play by human Row players as
they face human, RE, and EWA Column decision maker types in the Pursue-Evade game.
Additionally, the ﬁgure reports the results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of whether the Hu-
man’s distribution of Left play frequencies diﬀers when facing an algorithm opponent as
opposed to a human opponent. Previously we have observed that the learning algorithms
performed diﬀerently in the Column role of the Pursue-Evade game than in any other sit-
uation. This trend continues as the proportions of Left by humans in the Row role are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent when facing each learning algorithm than when facing another human.
Next we consider the CDFs generated by human Column players when playing against
Human, RE, and EWA Row decision maker types in the Pursue-Evade game. We see in Fig-
ure 7 that play against human opponents is statistically indistinguishable from play against
both EWA and RE opponents.
Next, we turn our attention to human play in the Gamble-Safe game. Figure 8 shows that
human Row players’ CDFs of proportion of Left play are not statistically diﬀerent as they
face Human and RE Column decision maker types. Finally, the CDFs and associated KS
tests generated by human Column players in the Gamble-Safe game are shown in Figure 9.
We see that play against human opponents diﬀers from play against RE opponents at the
six-percent level of signiﬁcance.
7 Discussion
Through experiments in which humans play games against computer- implemented learning
algorithms, we have established that humans do not detect nor exploit the estimated models’
18non-stationary but rather smooth mixed strategy processes. Furthermore, our experiments
provide a unique evaluation of the learning models by establishing that the models are
more sensitive than humans in detecting exploitable opponent play. However, the models’
corresponding mixed strategy adjustments are systematic but too weak to increase their
payoﬀs.
Recall the common formulation of both the RE and EWA models. We see their adaptive
functions generate sequences of action scores which adjust smoothly across periods because
stage game outcomes weakly impact action scores. Furthermore, our experiments reveal
that the learning algorithms’ mixed strategies respond uniformly and linearly to opponents
non-equilibrium action choice frequencies. The algorithms’ uniform better responses are too
weak to generate signiﬁcant payoﬀ gains.
Our study, in conjunction with other studies, reveals a diﬀerent depiction of human
learning in games. First, through the technique of pitting humans against algorithms we
know that humans successfully increase their payoﬀs (but not as much as possible) against
non- optimal but stationary mixed strategy play and against adaptive play that generates
highly serially correlated action sequences. On the other hand humans do not exploit the
subtle dynamic mixed strategy processes of the learning models examined in this paper.
Some sources of behavioral departure between learning models and humans are identiﬁed
in experiments that elicit subjects’ beliefs (Nyarko and Schotter [16]) or subjects’ mixed
strategies (Shachat [22]). Elicited beliefs are highly volatile and often times correspond to a
belief that one action will be chosen with certainty. Similarly elicited mixed strategies will
show erratic adjustments and a signiﬁcant amount of pure strategy play.
This set of stylized facts should set benchmarks which new learning models need to
explain. Furthermore, the use of human/algorithm interactions can play an important role in
future eﬀorts to identify how humans adapt in strategic environments. First, the technique
brings increased power in evaluating proposed models. Second, the adoption of carefully
selected algorithms will facilitate further identiﬁcation of human learning behavior. For
example, one could determine the extent of human ability to exploit serially correlated
strategies by altering the variance incorporated in the probabilistic choice rule of a cautious
ﬁctitious play algorithm. In this instance, the algorithm is not being evaluated: rather it is
19a carefully chosen stimulus to yield informative measurements of human behavior.
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23Column player
L R
Row player L 1, -1 0, 0
R 0, 0 2, -2
Table 1: Pursue-EvadeColumn player
L R
Row player L 2, 0 0, 1
R 1, 2 1, 1
Table 2: Gamble-SafeOpponent treatment
Game treatment Human EWA RE
Pursue-evade 40 30 30
Gamble-safe 34 0 24
Table 3: Number of subjects that participated in each treatment.(Humans are row player, Payoffs are for row player, minimax strategy proportions are next to action names)
E1 (.25) E2 (.75) A (.556) B (.244) C (.2)
S1 (.75) 3 -1 a (.400) 0 2 -1
S2 (.25) -9 3 b (.111) -3 3 5
c (.489) 1 -2 0
a1 (.426) a2 (.574) G (.2) R (.2) B (.2) P (.4)
b1 (.214) 6 -5 G (.2) -5 5 5 -5
b2 (.786) -2 1 R (.2) 5 -5 5 -5
B (.2) 5 5 -5 -5
P (.4) -5 -5 -5 5
Zero-Sum Games Used In Previous Studies
Fox Coricelli (Introduced by O’Neill)
Messick Lieberman
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Figure 1: Baseline Data and Estimated Model Summary for Pursue-Evade Game.L
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Figure 2: Baseline Data and Estimated Model Summary for Gamble-Safe Game.R
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Figure 3: Gamble-Safe joint densities of proportion Left; RE interactions.R
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Figure 4: Pursue-Evade joint densities of proportion Left; RE interactions.R
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Figure 5: Pursue-Evade joint densities of proportion Left; EWA interactions.conditioned on column treatments
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Figure 6: Distributions of Left by Human Row players in Pursue-Evade.conditioned on row treatments
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Figure 7: Distributions of Left by Human Column players in Pursue-Evade.conditioned on column treatments
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Figure 8: Distributions of Left by Human Row players in Gamble-Safe.conditioned on row treatments
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Figure 9: Distributions of Left by Human Column players in Gamble-Safe.